Duquesne Law Review
Volume 53
Number 2 A Tribute to Chief Justice Ronald D.
Castille and State Constitutional Law

Article 7

2015

Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review
Calvin Massey

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review, 53 Duq. L. Rev. 401 (2015).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol53/iss2/7

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal
Review
Calvin Massey*
I.
II.

INTRODU CTION .................................................................
THE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM .............................................
CONSEQUENCES OF ASYMMETRY ......................................
A HYPOTHETICAL SOLUTION ............................................
C O N CLU SIO N ....................................................................

III.
IV.
V.

I.

401
401
407
409
411

INTRODUCTION

What happens when a state's highest court decides a suit challenging state aid to religion, under circumstances where the plaintiff has standing under state law but not under federal law? If the
case is decided under federal law, or it is not clear that tshere are
adequate and independent state grounds for the decision,1 may the
United States Supreme Court review the state court's decision?
The answer is sometimes, depending on which party loses in the
state courts. If that asymmetry seems odd, what options are available to remedy this condition? This short essay seeks to explore
these issues and their consequences.
II.

THE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM

The degree to which the civil state may acknowledge or aid religious institutions is a matter of considerable contest under federal
constitutional law, but is also a ripe area of controversy under state
constitutions. States, of course, are free to read their own constitutional limits on governmental acknowledgment of or aid to religion
more strictly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the
limits imposed by the Federal Establishment Clause. Due to the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, such a reading
is insulated from further review by the Supreme Court, so long as
the state court clearly states that it is relying solely on state law to
*
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1. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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reach its decision. 2 But if a state court fails to make the grounds of
its decision explicit, the Supreme Court will assume that the state
court relied on federal law and may review the decision for its conformity with federal law. 3 To compound the problem, states are free
to entertain such suits under circumstances where standing would
4
not exist in federal court.
Nor is this problem limited to challenges of state assistance to
religion. The problem occurs whenever a state court decides an issue of federal law, statutory or constitutional, and can occur in
other instances of state constitutional challenges. For example,
should a state constitution specify that individual rights shall be
construed to conform with their federal analogs, 5 any decision resting on a state constitutional guarantee of individual rights would
be capable of review by the Supreme Court. 6 But such review becomes more complicated if the state court permits litigants to have
standing when they would lack standing in federal court.
To frame the issues more concretely, consider the recent case of
Duncan v. New Hampshire.7 New Hampshire enacted the Education Tax Credit program, under which business organizations are
entitled to tax credits against New Hampshire's business profits tax
or business enterprise tax of up to eighty-five percent of the their
contributions to eligible scholarship organizations. 8 Scholarship organizations are permitted to award scholarships to eligible students
"to attend . . . a non-public school."9 New Hampshire taxpayers
sued in state court, contending that the program violated the New
Hampshire Constitution's requirement that "no money raised by
2. Id. at 1040-41.
3. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
4. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
5. In 1990, California voters took precisely this action with respect to the state constitutional rights of accused criminal defendants. Proposition 115, a citizen initiative under
article I, section 24 of the California Constitution, added a provision that the state constitutional rights of the accused shall be "construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States." To gild the lily, the measure stated that
"this Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to offer greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States." The California Supreme Court subsequently voided this addition because it was a revision of the state constitution, rather than an amendment. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). Under
California's Constitution, revisions can only be achieved by legislative proposal and voter
ratification. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§1, 3.
6. This is the necessary result of the Court's observation in Michigan u. Long, supra,
that "when ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with ...

federal law ...

we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that

the state court decided the case the way it did because ... federal law required it to do so."
463 U.S. at 1040.
7. 102 A.3d 913 (N.H. 2014).
8. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 77-G (supp. 2013).
9. Id.
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taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of schools or
institutions of any religious sect or organization." 10 Three New
Hampshire citizens who desired that their children continue to receive scholarships under the program intervened, along with a nonprofit organization that benefitted from the program.11 A trial court
ruled that the tax credits were "money raised by taxation" because
they were in essence tax expenditures-"[m]oney that would otherwise be flowing to the government. 1 2 Because religious schools
would use some of that money, the trial court invalidated the program as applied to credits for contributions made to scholarship organizations granting scholarships to religious schools. 1 3 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and
ordered the case to be dismissed for lack of standing.1 4 The plaintiffs lacked standing because their claimed injuries-net fiscal
losses incurred by New Hampshire government and reduced funding for public schools-were a generalized grievance suffered indistinguishably by all New Hampshire residents. 15 To reach this conclusion the court relied upon federal constitutional cases governing
standing16 and a similar Rhode Island case,1 7 after concluding that
a statutory amendment conferring taxpayer standing in such cases
was an impermissible attempt to empower the courts to render ad18
visory opinions at the behest of individuals.
Left unspoken was the question of whether the New Hampshire
Constitution's separation of powers requires a litigant to prove a
personalized, concrete injury in fact in order to have standing. If

10. N. H. CONST. part 11, art. 83.
11. Duncan, 102 A.3d at 917.
12. Id. at 918.
13. Id. at 918.
14. Id. at 917.
15. Id. at 926.
16. The court relied on DaimlerChrysleru.Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006), Lujan u.Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Valley Forge Christian College u.Americans United for
Separationof Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
17. Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130 (R.I. 2012).
18. N.H. CONST. part II, art. 74 limits advisory opinions to those requested by either the
Governor or the Legislature. The statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 491:22 (I), provided in relevant part that any taxpayer "shall be deemed to have an equitable right and interest in the
preservation of an orderly and lawful government... ;therefore any taxpayer.., shall have
standing" to allege that a "taxing district ... has engaged, or proposes to engage, in conduct
that is unlawful or unauthorized "and need not "demonstrate that his or her personal rights
were impaired or prejudiced." The New Hampshire Supreme Court read this provision to
eliminate the requirement that a litigant prove personalized concrete injury in fact in order
to have standing, thus creating a private right to seek an advisory opinion.
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so, the legislature could not dispense with this requirement. Implicitly, that is what the New Hampshire Supreme Court said. 19
Suppose, however, that the injury in fact requirement is not mandated by the state's constitution, and that the plaintiffs in Duncan,
on a rehearing, succeed in so persuading the court. Or suppose that
the Governor requests the state supreme court to render an advisory opinion concerning the validity of the tax credit program.
Now the court must proceed to the merits. For purposes of this
hypothetical Duncan Redux, assume that the New Hampshire Supreme Court upholds the validity of the Education Tax Credit program, perhaps by concluding that the tax credits are not "money
raised by taxation" or that the scholarships given to students at religious schools are not for the use of religious schools but for use by
the private recipient in choosing where to redeem the scholarship.
The losing plaintiffs think this result offends the Federal Establishment Clause, even if it comports with New Hampshire's Constitution. 20 But do they have standing to petition the Supreme Court for
review?
According to ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,21 the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue review in the U.S. Supreme Court. In ASARCO, individual taxpayers and an association of public school teachers contended in state court that an Arizona law, governing mineral royalties from state lands, violated the Federal Enabling Act, admitting
Arizona as a state, and the Arizona Constitution. 22 Both the federal
law and the Arizona Constitution required that leases of public land
be at the full-appraised value; the Arizona statute dispensed with
that requirement.2 3 Because the royalties were to be in trust for the
support of public schools, the plaintiffs contended that they were
injured by lower payments to the school trust "resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes."24 While states are free to set their own

19. By ruling that the legislature acted unconstitutionally in its attempt to confer upon
private individuals the power to obtain an advisory opinion, the court declared a constitutional requisite for standing. Of course, there might be cases, which are not advisory, but in
which standing depends on other limits imposed by separation of powers.
20. Of course, the petitioner-plaintiffs would probably be wrong. Dictum in Arizona
ChristianSchool Tuition Organizationu.Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436 (2011), Mueller u.Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983), and Zelman u.Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), suggests that the tax
credit scheme complies with the Establishment Clause.
21.

490 U.S. 605 (1989).

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 614.

Summer 2015

Standing in State Courts

standing rules independent of the Article III limits on standing applicable to federal courts, 25 the taxpayers' injury was not sufficiently personal for standing in federal court; all citizens shared the
same interest in levels of taxation. 26 Moreover, the injury, even if
countenanced, was not capable of redress by courts. 27 If the Arizona
law was voided, it was entirely speculative whether the state's contribution to public schools would be increased, or whether taxes
would be lowered. 28 These outcomes lay within the discretion of
Arizona's elected politicians, not the courts. 29 For the same reason,
the association had no standing under Article III because its injury-an "adverse economic impact"-was not capable of judicial re30
dress.
But the claims were made in the Arizona courts, which permitted
standing where Article III would deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. The Arizona Supreme Court voided the statute, and the
mineral lessees sought certiorari. 31 Unlike the plaintiff taxpayers,
the mineral lessees had standing to seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. 32 Even though the case had come to a final judgment
in the state courts without federal standing, the mineral lessees had
standing because the state court judgment caused "direct, specific,
and concrete injury" to the mineral lessees, who were the first to
invoke federal jurisdiction at a time when the Article III case or
33
controversy requirement was met.
Applying these principles to the certiorari petition of the losing
taxpayers in Duncan Redux produces the result that the taxpayers
lack standing to press a claim that the Education Tax Credit violates the Federal Establishment Clause. They lack a personalized
injury in fact and the judiciary is arguably unable to redress the

25. Id. at 620 (explaining that "state courts are not bound by Article III and yet have it
within their power and proper role to render binding judgments on issues of federal law,
subject only to review by this Court.").
26. Id. at 608.
27. Id. at 614-15.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 614 (quoting the associations' complaint).
31. Id. at 610.
32. Id. at 623-24.
33. Id.
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alleged injury. 34 Indeed, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,35 is precisely on point.
But what if the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the hypothetical Duncan Redux ruled that the tax credit was unconstitutional.
Would the intervenors or New Hampshire have standing to seek
review in the United States Supreme Court? The answer depends
on whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court would have decided
the case solely on the grounds that the tax credit scheme violated
the state constitution. So long as the state supreme court makes a
"plain statement in its judgment or opinion that ... federal cases.
.do not themselves compel the result [and] clearly and expressly
[declares that the decision is] based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state law] grounds," 36 the United States
Supreme Court "will not undertake to review the decision. '37 In
that event there is no recourse in the Supreme Court for the losing
intervenors. If, however, the state court relies on federal precedents or interweaves them with its discussion of state law and fails
to make the clear statement of its reliance solely on state law, the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is no obstacle to
review. The Supreme Court will assume "that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law
required it to do so." 38 And because the intervenors are the first
party in this case to seek federal jurisdiction they have the opportunity to prove they meet the Article III requirements. The intervenors have a personalized concrete injury in fact-the loss of their
children's eligibility for tax credit subsidized scholarships-the injury is caused by the state court's decision, and the injury can be
redressed by a holding that federal law does not invalidate the
scheme.
This phenomenon is not unique to suits challenging state aid to
religion. Of course, given the shrunken applicability of taxpayer
34. There is an unlikely possibility of review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Suppose the
state's attorney general and governor conclude, after a change of heart, that the Education
Tax Credit violates the Federal Constitution. They might assert, perhaps in an independent
federal suit, that the state has standing as parens patriaeto assert the generalized grievance
that an ordinary citizen could not assert. Cf. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). One feature of state authority might be the power to assert the
undifferentiated public rights of their citizens-in this case, the right to have their state
government conform to the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, State Standing
After Massachusetts u.EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 277-78 (2009).
35. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding Arizona taxpayers lacked standing to challenge an
Arizona tax credit for private contributions to school tuition organizations that granted scholarships to students attending religious schools).
36. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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standing to challenge such aid in federal courts, 39 there is a greater
possibility that state courts will grant taxpayer standing, whereas
the federal courts would be closed to taxpayer standing. Taxpayer
standing under Flast v. Cohen 40 is virtually chimerical, so litigants
have an incentive to bring suits challenging state aid to religion in
state courts, where standing rules may be less settled and more
fluid. There is no reason why state courts must adhere to federal
principles of standing, but if they expand standing beyond the limits of Article III, they must consider the consequences of their expansion.

I1.

CONSEQUENCES OF ASYMMETRY

The foremost consequence of asymmetry is that expanded state
standing will provide a powerful incentive for resolving disputes,
whenever possible, explicitly under the state constitution or some
rule of state law that is both adequate for the disposition and wholly
independent of federal law. The failure to do so would produce the
asymmetrical result that the original plaintiff would lack standing
in federal court to seek review of an adverse state judgment in the
United States Supreme Court, while the original defendant would
have standing to seek federal review of an adverse state judgment.
State courts could prevent this asymmetry by ruling on exclusively
state grounds, but they may not be able to do so in every case. When
federal law does not stipulate exclusive federal jurisdiction, state
courts will have occasion to entertain and decide issues of federal
law. When state courts conclude that a challenged governmental
action does not violate the state constitution, it will usually be
forced to decide the question of whether the same action violates
the Federal Constitution. In either of these circumstances a state
employing expanded standing will create an asymmetrical standing
result once review is sought in the federal courts.
Expanded standing in state courts also creates incentives for
strategic behavior. Suppose that a state grants financial aid to individual drug addicts in the form of a voucher redeemable at nonprofit drug rehabilitation organizations, including those that use
39. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing to challenge spending
under the Establishment Clause upheld), with Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (taxpayer standing to challenge property transfer under the Establishment Clause denied); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 603-09 (2007) (no taxpayer standing to challenge general
appropriations under the Establishment Clause), and Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (no taxpayer standing to challenge tax credits under the Establishment Clause).
40. 392 U.S. at 83.
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religious teachings as part of the rehabilitation process. A litigant
asserts in state court only the generalized grievance that the vouchers redeemable at facilities using religious teaching offend the state
constitution and the Federal Establishment Clause. The state then
removes the case to federal court, 41 where the state constitutional
claim is severed and remanded to state court. 42 The federal action
is then dismissed for lack of standing, but the state action continues. A voucher recipient who is a devout religious believer successfully intervenes in the state action. If the state's highest court rules
that the vouchers violate the state constitution the intervenor has
standing to seek federal review, based on a claimed violation of the
Free Exercise Clause, 43 as he has suffered injury in fact caused by
the ruling and that injury is redressable by the courts if his free
exercise claim is successful. If the court upholds the voucher plan
under the state constitution, the losing plaintiff lacks standing to
seek federal review. Moreover, the religious intervenor might intervene in the parallel federal action, where his federal claim rooted
in the Free Exercise Clause will receive the hearing that may not
be obtained by seeking review of the state court judgment in the
United States Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, a litigant with a generalized grievance would be well advised to assert
in state court only the state constitutional issue. If he wins he risks
only the possibility that the religious intervenor's petition for certiorari will be granted. The odds are in the original plaintiffs favor.
But if he combines his federal and state claims he risks a hearing
on the intervenor's claim and a possible adverse outcome in that
forum.
What happens if a state expands standing for all questions of
state constitutional law or other issues that involve only issues of
state law, but adheres to a clone of Article III standing for any case
that involves federal law? A state would surely be free to read its
constitutional provisions mandating separation of powers to allow
standing whenever the legislature has conferred standing. If this
reading of state constitutional limits on standing had been in place
in the actual Duncan case, the plaintiffs would have had standing.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.").
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (providing that cases presenting a federal claim and a pendent
state claim removable, with state claim to be severed and remanded to state court).
43. The free exercise claim may lack merit. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). But
the intervenor has standing to seek review.
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Even in the absence of such legislation, a state supreme court would
be free to find generalized grievances of the sort raised in Duncan
sufficient for standing. The difference between these two modes of
expanding state standing lies in the ability of the state supreme
court to restrict standing to the Article III requisites in cases involving federal law. For example, if the legislature has validly exercised its state constitutional authority to permit any citizen to assert a generalized grievance, the state judiciary cannot contravene
this directive. But if expanded standing is the product of a judicial
decision that such standing does no violence to the state's doctrine
of separation of powers, the state supreme court may credibly declare its prudential reasons for limiting standing in cases in which
federal law is at issue. The principal prudential reason is, of course,
to remove the possibility of asymmetrical standing when review is
sought in the federal courts.
Another consequence of expanded standing in state courts, at
least with respect to state constitutional claims or issues of pure
state law, is that state courts will become a forum for deciding many
public policy issues that are stripped of the adversarial quality that
has traditionally defined the limits of the judicial role. This choice
means that the state judiciary will likely resolve state law issues
more broadly than it would in adversarial litigation. If any person
can bring suits challenging the validity of state actions, those suits
will almost necessarily be claims that the action is facially invalid.
Without personalized injury in fact, there is scarcely any ground to
limit decision to a particular application of the law or practice. If
injury in fact is eliminated as a requirement for standing, then
there is no need to consider causation or redressability. The judiciary will become a frequent, if not almost automatic, reviewer of the
validity of executive and legislative action. Taken to an extreme,
the familiar process of legislation-approval by legislature and governor-will be supplemented by a further approval of the judiciary.
Although states are free to make these alterations, they should consider these costs, which are in addition to the asymmetry problems
presented when federal issues are resolved in the state courts.
IV.

A HYPOTHETICAL SOLUTION

How could a state expand standing yet stay within the Article III
limits, thus preserving possible Supreme Court review of federal
issues decided by the highest state court? This might seem oxymoronic, or perhaps quixotic, but there exist some theoretical possibilities. First, it appears that the Article III requirements of causation
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and redressability may be relaxed when a litigant asserts a "procedural right." In a footnote in his majority opinion for the Court in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 44 Justice Scalia conceded that 'procedural rights are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. '' 45 But a concrete injury is still necessary to assert the
procedural right. Or is it? Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in Lujan, noted that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case
or controversy where none existed before [but] Congress at the very
least must identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."46 In theory, if
a state were to identify a concrete injury and limit assertion of that
injury to a class of people so injured, it might have created standing
that would satisfy Article III, should a litigant seek further review
in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Consider the following possibility in the context of Duncan. Suppose New Hampshire enacts a law that gives any taxpayer the right
to request from the revenue department of the state an estimate of
the amount of reduction in state spending for other purposes that
will occur by state expenditures (including tax expenditures) that
might be expended in aid of religion, assuming no new revenue.
Suppose that the law further provides that if the estimated total
reduction, multiplied by the requesting taxpayer's tax payments as
a percentage of state revenue, exceeds $100, the taxpayer is provided the right to sue the state by calling into question the validity
of any such expenditure under the state and federal constitutions.
Under federal standing law "informational injury" is sufficient to
establish the injury in fact requirement. For example, the Freedom
of Information Act gives "any person" the right to receive certain
government records. 47 In EPA v. Mink, the Supreme Court read the
FOIA to confer "a judicially enforceable public right to secure such
information from ... official hands. ' 48 In FEC v. Akins, the Court
upheld the standing of plaintiffs claiming that, under the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, 49 a lobbying organization should be
classified as a political committee and subject to disclosure of its
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 572 n.7.
Id. at 580.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
2 U.S.C. § 431(4).
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political contributions. 50 The reason this claim was not a generalized grievance-as in United States v. Richardson,51 where the
plaintiffs claimed that the CIA's refusal to disclose its expenditures
violated the public accounts clause52-was that Congress had specifically created a new informational right that authorized the
suit.53 Thus, the hypothetical scheme, validly created under state
law, would also constitute sufficient informational injury to support
Article III standing. The addition of a cause of action for those taxpayers whose proportionate share of reduced state expenditures on
matters apart from aid to religion exceeds $100 is, to paraphrase
Justice Kennedy, a defined injury and an articulation of a chain of
causation that produces a case or controversy in the federal courts
(when it arrives there) where none existed before. The state has
identified the injury it seeks to vindicate and has related that injury
to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. Perhaps this is a gimmick but, if so, it calls into question such cases as FEC v. Akins.
V.

CONCLUSION

States face some hard choices in deciding upon their standing
rules. If they permit standing under circumstances impermissible
in the federal courts, they must confront the consequences of the
asymmetry produced by the differences between federal and state
standing rules. If they limit standing to the requirements under
Article III they have effectively foregone their independence. There
are several gambits that states might employ to blunt or eradicate
asymmetry. One is to permit expanded standing for questions of
pure state law, but adhere to Article III standards for cases involving pure federal law or mixed questions of federal and state law.
Another is to replicate the differing standards under Article III that
permit somewhat expanded standing where procedural rights are
invoked. All of these possibilities, however, simply highlight the
difficult policy choices that states must make given the reality of
asymmetrical standing.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 20.

